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The agrarian counter-revolution in the Transvaal and
the origins of segregation: 1902-1913.
This paper seeks to examine the circumstances surrounding the rise of a segregationist
ideology in South Africa during the decade after the .Boer War, culminating in the
Natives1 Land Act of 1913. In tracing this development, the approach is essentially
one of establishing a relationship between the underlying structures that mada
segregation materially possible and the cleavages within the white political systea
that increasingly drove the polity towards an ideology of segregation.
Such a relationship can be seen as crucial for the success of any fora of segregation.
which was the political response by a colonial superstructure to a changing economic
base (1), since it sought to reverse any change in the relationship between, coloniser
and colonised (2). It is necessary, however, in delineating this process of change,
to be historically specific and show which groups within the society were able,
through access to political power, to effect major economic and political gains for
themselves. This approach may be said to contrast with much of the current
descriptive analysis that seeks to explain changes through the application of
^terminology. Thus, though it might be possible to describe change within South
Africa through a model of "development and underdevelopment" (3) or of "internal
colonialism" (4), this does not explain how and why such changes occurred. In
the final analysis, the developments analysed in this paper occurred through the
access and application of political power and there was very little that was
inevitable about this. Though it might be theoretically possible to account for
political changes through a "theory of the superstructure", as Wolpe suggest (5),
such a deterministic view of history is precluded by the unpredictability in the
flow and influence of ideas.
However, ideas themselves are anchored in seme kind of material reality and their
nature and importance have recently been seen by Legassick. In a series of seminar
papers, he has shown hou a distinct segrega^ory model emerged in South Africa:
The model grew out of and reacted back on a social system, emphasising
certain features and ignoring others, shaped by the system and reshaping
it (6),
\ and this paper seeks to expand further some of Legassick's analysis and set the
^ development of ideas more firmly within a sociological context where pressures
from groups and interests edged the political system to some form o£ separatism.
Any straight "history of ideas" runs into the problem of giving a false impression
of the nature of ideological change: ideas do not exist in vacuo but only survive
within social structures.. In this respect the problem is tha same as that
surrounding the English church before the Civil War; as Christopher Hill has
argued:
The connexions between different groups of ideas are subtle and difficult
to analyse, but they exist: they exist because of the unity of the individual
and of the society in which he lives. It is to the structure of society
that we must look for the keys to interpretation. Otherwise we shall
distort and do violence to the history we are studying (7).
In the Transvaal, however, there is a further factor which can help to unify the
focus of analysis. Trie economic system and social structure was dominated by
two great interest*: mining capitalism and agriculture and these substantially
defined the nature and course of political change. Though it is probably true,
as for example Mavby has argced (8), that the mining capitalists especially did
not directly influence political decision making, cercainly before 1907, there is
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varthslsss a close and direct similarity between economic interest groups
Liticians within capitalist societies. Some analysts, in fact, have pointed out
v the liberal democratic system, in its nature, resembles the working of the free-
rket system (9) and it is certainly fair to assume that botih politicians anil business-
n seek to maximise "resources": the fonaer political (votes) the latter material
rofita). In this latter respect, therefore, the politicians in the Transvaal can
sean as "political entrepreneurs" (10) who sought to maximise the voting potential
issuas that they jaw as salient. These issues would fluctuate according to their
rceptions of political cleavages: before the advent of Responsible Government in the
ansvaal in 1907, for example, the opposition focused around issues like.language
ghts, Chinese labour and return of Boer War exiles and compensation for the War (11).
. no particular time was the "Native question" the saliant political issue, partly
cause of a tacit agreement to "keep it out of party politics" and partly because,
ilike the Cape, there was no political leverage that could be exerted by non-whites
.thin the white political system by means of the qualified franchise (12).
iwever, in a basic sense, the issue of power between whites and blacks in the Transvaal
LS a salient issue for on it depended the nature of the Colony's political and economic
Lture. In the initial period after the Boer War, the Transvaal was presented with a
lallenge from below by its non-vhites who, with certain limited gains they had managed
> -'•ake during the War, sought to change the power relations between the racial groups.
L ...Jditicn, with the advent of Responsible Government in 1907, the Transvaal was faced
.th a political challenge in the form of the envisaged Union or Federation of South
irica and the need to iormulata a clear and distinct "native policy". Any such
ilicy would have to define the Transvaal?s position vis a vis the Cape African
ranchise and seek, as a minimum, a compromise which did not endanger the existing
rstsni of power relations In uha Transvaal where white politicians did not, as it can
» argued they had to in the Cape, compece for non-white votes and mobilise their
>olitical resources" accordingly.
xese challenges to the system of power relations in the Transvaal eventually produced
political response that sought to stabilise and encrench the balance or powar there.
: is the argument of this paper that this response was facilitated through the
ivelopment and articulation of an ideology of segregation thct was successfully embedded
Lthin white political thinking after 1907. Through analysing the nature cf these
slitical challenges in the Transvaal and the response to them, it is hoped co throw
)re light on the nature of segregation in South Africa and the reasons for its extension
i South Africa in the twentieth century (13).
n Challenge presented by non-whites after the Boer War: 1902-1907:
le agrarian sector of the Transvaal economy after the Boer War was still basically
lara^terised by feudal relations of production (14), as it had been in the Nineteenth
sntury. However, this feudalism was starting to change and it is here that the main
aitial challenge fro-2 non-whites came. Large numbers of Africans, though they did not
wn any actual land, were being gradually integrated into the European-dcmina-ted
conomy as tenants and squatters on white farms and through growing migrant labour
nto the towns and cities, especially Johannesburg and Pretoria. In addition, there
ere established government locations where traditional African political structures
urvived in a modified form under the rule of the chiefs and there were also a snail
umber of wholly African-owned farms, though they were usually registered in the names
f missionaries, as well as a number of Africans living in "undefined" locations and
Qvernnetit Crown Lands. In statistical terms, the picture in 1903 at the time of the
itst, rather inaccurate census appeared as follows,
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• TABLE ONE.
Dispersal of Africans in the Transvaal, 1903.
Density per sq, ml
Govt.
Locations
Farms
owned by
Africans.
Undefined
Locations:
a) Private
Farms
b) Govt.
Farms &
Crown
Lands
Area in sq. mis.
2,054
712
Est. Pop.
111,919
41,180
54.0 .
57,8
3,932
1,175
103,323
111,196
134,880
81,820
235,867
605,666
34,3
69,0
2,2
av. 5,4
Source: Transvaal Native Affairs Department, Annual Report, 1904.
This system, however, by no neans encouraged agricultural efficiency. Fanning tended
to be practised on an "extensive" scale and produced a low output: in 1907, for example,
South Africa as a whole was importing nearly £5 millions of meat, butter, cheese and
other agricultural products that, could veil be produced at home (15). Similarly,
in the Transvaal, the years after the Boer War vere bad ones and large amounts of
agricultural produce were still being imported (16). This inefficiency brought
continual complaints, as for example by the Union Department of Agriculture:
The curse of South African agriculture is the big farm. The size of the
average fam in the Transvaal is 5000 acres, in the United States 143, in
Great Britain 63 and in Belgium 14£ ... It is appalling to contemplate
the vast tracts of land that are owned by single individuals all over the
Union- You see a poor, daub cottage, a few starved cattle, a mealie
patch of five acres of green, and you are told that the total area of
the property is 50C0 acres (17). • -
This was in 1912 but even before then there vere repeated calls for "Closer Land
Settlement" which would enable more productive use of the land while at the same
time encouraging an extensive policy of white immigration and land settlement.
Immediately after the Boer War, in fact, there vas a general hope among many
English-speakers that the Milner administration would shift the population balance
against the Boers through encouraging settlement on the land and in 1904 a "Handbook
for Settlers" published by the Department of Agriculture argued:
That the Transvaal possesses great possibilities as regards agriculture
cannot bs doubted...
There appears to be no reason why, in the near future, the agriculture of
the new colonies should not only supply their own local market, and those
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perhaps of neighbouring states, who are large importers of foreign
produce, but it is probable that products tor which Che country is
specially adapted will find the European market available (18).
But hopes such as these depended upon a restructuring of the agricultural sy
eliaiaating competition from both the poorer Boers and ths nascent African peasant
class which, as the analysis will later show, had the potential of edging its way
gradually into the market system. On the other hand, this strategy tor agricultural
development depended in turn upon the use of political power and the ability to wield
it credibly. It was clear, in che initial period after the war, that the Milner
administration did seek to use this power won through war, though the logical
implication of complete social engineering that the Milner administration envisaged
(19) failed eventually through inability to carry conviction both among the Transvaal
British population and the politicians in Britain (20). Nevertheless, at first,
Lagden's attitude on the question of war compensation for Boer farmers was explicit:
They are like the Kaffirs, a very ungrateful people. The more you
do for them the more they want (21).
Lagden was able to persuade the administration to take a harsh line on the restitution
of Boer cattle which had been taken from, or in many cases "loaned to", the African
):bes. The Resolution 450 of 1902 was suspended through Lagden's pressure and this
meant that the Boers could no longer expect state backing in their cases which would no-;
have to be pursued through private law suits. The ostensible reason for this "owing
to the attitude taken up by the Boer farmers" (22) but the more general reason lay
in the preference of the Milner administration to tackle the Boer question first and
leave the African one till later, especially as there was extreme caution not to
foment any African rebellion. Thus, any restitution of cattle t-o the Boers, in
Lagden's words "naturally caused restlessness- and set up a strong feeling of injustice
in the minds of the native who wanted to keep the cattle which they have lawfully
gained, and did not want compensation in return" (23)
This policy, combined with a general financial stringency on poor white relief was
aimed initially at removing the economic base of the rural Afrikaner classes who.
it was hoped, vould be swamped by large-scale English settlement that would remove
the problem once and for all. It had, politically, the opposite effect in th3t it
mobilised the mass of Afrikaners into opposition. Denoon, for example, has seen
Het Volk's formation in 1905 as "little more than a public acknowledgment cf an
uninterrupted but unofficial existence" (24) and certainly as far back as May 1904
J the Boer Congress the first seeds were being sown- Here Botha asked for aid
co the bywoner class and employment for them in the civil service and the police
force (25) and it was clear that the Milner policy was beginning to produce unfore-
seen political repercussions. Botha claimed that the £3 million state aid promised
at the Treaty of Vareeniging had not been forthcoming and a focus was started on the
"poor white" problem that was to lead to the establishment of the Transvaal Indigency
Commission in 1906.
The existence of a class of poor whites in a racially divided context as the
Transvaal after the Boer War can be seen as one crucial factor that destroyed any
possibility of exploiting divisions within Afrikanerdotn between Hensonpers and
Bittereinders and the potential class cleavages that these differences suggested.
Instead, econoaic differences tended to get masked over in a cleavage defined along
"national" lines, though it was not incidental that the leadership of Het Volk was
dominated by such wealthy landowners as Botha and Rissik (26.). The actual basis of
this potential class cleavage needs much further research: most.usefully, perhaps,
by looking at Lhe composition of Agricultural Societies and their relationship to
the Transvaal Agricultural Union, of which Botha was made an Honourary Vice-president
in 1904. From his early offer of seats on the Legislative Council to Botha, S^ iuts
and De La Rey and his reluctance to pursue legal action against Botha for dubious
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lap.d deals (27), Kilner was clearly interested in some kind of political accord with
the Afrikaner leaders that would have produced a clearer class alignment in Transvaal
politics than actually occurred. It was the long-run imperialist objective of
swamping A£rikarier. nationalism by a British counter nationalism that can be considered
the crucial factor in defeating Milner!s objectives; as Denoon has argued:
Milnerrs paternalistic contempt for Afrikaners as a whole, and his
conviction that nationality over-rode everyother interest, immunised
him against overt malice. If he had been vindictive, and had diverted
the government's resources to the patronage of the bijwoner class, the
consequences for Transvaal Afrikaner prospects might have been very
serious indeed (28).
Instead, British imperial rule in the Transvaal created the political preconditions
for the saliency of the poor white vote to be mobilised on a nationalist basis while
at the same time, as the later accord between Het Volk and the Labour Party at both
the 1906 and 1910 elections showed, potential was created for splitting the British
vote in the Transvaal on class lines and thus creating a parliamentary majority which,
after 1907, as Mawby has argued, left the British in the Transvaal a mere pressure . .
group (29).
^ was an important aura attached to the white vote in the Transvaal which could be
made to appear as threatened by the swamping from non-whites: whether it be over the
"Chinese slave labour issue" or pressure on skilled white jobs in the urban area on
which the Transvaal Indigency Commission reported. It was on this point that Botha
laboured in his memorandum to the Labour Corcmission in 1903, saying the "threat"
meant that the Transvaal could become like Natal with its large Indian population:
It would be disastrous to the interests of. the white population of
South Africa if a similar mistake were made in the Transvaal (30).
The emotive issue of preserving the white race from non-white economic competition
on both the land and in industry provided at least an important political precondition
for a separatist political stance,- given certainly the cleavages on national grounds,
which have been outlined. As the inhabitants of Potgietersrust petitioned Rissik
at the Department of Native Affairs on the advent of Responsible Government:
White people who are through bread compelled to plough for the natives,
to earn a piece of bread in that way, are unable to do so without
a Pass for that purpose...
This suggests a clear loss of social status on racial as well as economic grounds and
indicates one probable source for the rejection of "kaffirverk", to be institutionalized
in the Colour Bar Act of the Hertzog government. The actual extent of this kind of
white poverty in the Transvaal needs further research, though it is hampered by the
absence of any proper census before 1911. The Carnegie Commission reached no actual
conclusion on the number of rural poor, though it shows that the rural population
increased in the Transvaal between 1904 and 1911 by 41.31% and that in 1911 the
while male population engaged in agricultural pursuits was 43,774 (53,079 by 1936)
(32). Professor Macraillan has estimated that the "rural poor", using criteria based
on the Johannesburg Relief Board, was between 20 and 30%. This makes the poverty figure
in the Transvaal by 1911, at a conservative estimate, at around 9000 in terms of male
voters (33). Clearly, the white poverty issue was not unimportant in terms of votes
out of a total franchise of 106,594 and this point did not seem to be lost on Het
Volk in its electioneering.
These developments, however, need to be set within a general context of a growing
economic and political challenge from non-whites which crucially defined the nature
of political action from the white polity. In the rural areas, of some 11,650 farms,
less than half were occupied by white fanners (34) and the growing c-jnpetic Ion. croia
nor.-u-hitf.s presented Che polity with a need to define a coherent "native policy".
Such a policy as there was lacked exactitude and tended to be based, as far as the
main principles were concerned, on the policy introduced under the British occupation
of 1377 to 1331 (35). The system then introduced made the Native Administrator
supreme chief of all the African tribes, on the Natal system, and the landdrosts
became administrators of native law, which was recognisable in the Transvaal courts.
The Shepstonian ideas of segregation (36) were further introduced in the Fretoria
Convention of 1881 when a Locations Conmission was created in order to demarcate
native locations. These 3ritish provisions were supplemented by a Squatters Law'
(plakkers Wet) in 1895 which, sought, very unsuccessfully, to limit the number of
squatters to five families per farm. By the end of the Boer War, however, many of
these instruments of a "native policy" had not been very rigidly enforced, squatting
was rampant and uncontrolled and many locations remained to be beaconed off.
This was the system inherited by the British colonial administration in 1902 when
Sir Godfrey Lagden, former Resident Commissioner in Basutoland, became Commissioner
of Native Affairs. While he sought to deal with the immediate question of claims
by Boer farmers, the policy towards the African tribes was one of caution. Tne
general consciousness of the Africans was raised by the expectations engendered by
•'•^e War, especially when they had been promised cattle by the British in return
lor aid against the Boers. Chief Sekukuni, for example, was promised such cattle
by General Kitchener "if you do not allow them (the Boers) to pass into youc country"
(37): a fact which, when, it was pointed out to him, Lagden found "extremely embarres-
sir.g" C.3S). The general attitude" prevailing among the Africans was not lost on
Lagden either; as Hogge, the Resident Cornmissioner for Sekukuniland, reported:
...the feeling is one for entire independence from the Government,
Sekukuni paying tribute only in the form of the Hut Tax to be
collected by his and har.ded over in large sums to the Government (39),
and there were similar reports from the Western Transvaal. Hare reports indicated
a general state of terror among the Boer farmers as they tried to return to their
farms after the war only to find them occupied by LinchweTs Bakgatla. The tribes
here had dona well financially out of the war and were well armed so that, as one
traveller reported in 1903:
Up to December last year not a single Boer had dared to come back
to the Pilandsberg, but now a few are summoning up courage to do so,
•-' relying on the South African Constabulary (40).
There was also, in the Northern Transvaal, the legacy of the rebellion of the Vend a
under Chief M'phephu in 1898, leading to the l3tterTs expulsion into Rhodesia.
Lagden was at first against his return after the Boer War and the tribe continued
to be ruled by the chiefs and M'phephu's brother. It was only in July 1904 that
M'phephu was allowed to return "subject to his good behaviour and without prejudice
to any land policy which the Government may hereafter deem fit to adopt" (41)
In this situation, Lagden was unable at first to enforce any firm policy. The main
strategy was to proceed cautiously and to look for the first signs of resistance.
"experience has... taught many of us" he wrote to Wheelright, the Native Commissioner
for the Northern Transvaal, "to read the signs (of revolt) in ways that the ordinary
public dp not look for, particularly when impertinence is shown to messengers - that
'is almost a sure sign of something wrong" (42). The first step, then, was to proceed
"ith a cautious policy of disarmament and a large number of guns were bought frora the
Africans for £3 when they often cost, in Gazaland, from £10 to £15. "If anything
could have caused open resistance" Lagden wrote again to Wheelright ."It would
presumably have been disarmament" (43).
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With disarmament accomplished relatively successfully, although there were reports
in lyQ3 that the Safcgatla were still well armed \44), Lagden was able to proceed
to Che task, of re-establishing the structure o? native administration in the
Transvaal. Though he undoubtedly based much of his policy on the precedent of
the Transvaal Republic, another clear influence was that of his experience in
Basutolar.d. Lagd^n wrote later in glowing terms of the success of the policy
pursued in Bnsutoland, and this clearly shaped his thinking about the nost effective
way of delegating power to African chiefs in a system of indirect rule that was
applied, as John Benyon has shown, through the High Corcraission in South Africa (45).
"The predominant thought in the minds of those who were set the task of rebuilding
the structure so much shattered by the Gun War", Lagden wrote of Basutoland,
"was to enlist in the effort the cooperation of the natives themselves. This
could only be done by inducing their leaders with certain powers and giving theni
an interest in the conduct of their own affairs'* (46).
This previous experience of Basutoland clearly influenced Lagden on the means by
which the overall policy of Milnerism (47) could'be attained. This point needs
stressing because Legassick,'f or example, has been concerned to stress the role
of British imperial hegemony in South Africa and its ultimate end in view while
under-rating the means to attain it:
) ...SANAC was prepared as a guideline for future reference in the best
imperial tradition through a synthesis of imperial guidelines with local
expertise. The measure of the influence of the period of British
hegemony is the extent to which its recommendations were disseminated,
adopted, and implemented; and the extent and manner in which this was
done by Imperial representatives (48).
This view ignores the system of administration established in the Transvaal by
Milner where considerable departmental autonomy was permitted and there wera often
considerable clashes of opinion and personality (43). . Most of Lagden1s time during
the time SANAC was doing its work was spent on departmental matters in the Transvaal;
even the Orange River Colony came only slightly into the scheme of things, since
that too was run on autonomous lines (50). So, in the absence of further research
on the exact influences exerted on SANAC, it may be safely argued that one of the
dominant considerations was that of establishing an effective system of native
policy in the Transvaal-
This argument is illuminated by the similarity between the policy of native
^ administration in the Transvaal and the report of SANAC. As early as 1902, for •
example, Lagden wrote to Wheelright:
It is being reported that the power of the chiefs is being displaced by
the power assumed by the Native Commissioner. . This is perfectly correct
because we shall do no good until the chiefs are simply our policemen (51)
Emphasis added.
while immediately after the SANAC report was published in 1905 and before Lagden
went on leave to England, a memorandum was written on the applicability of the
SANAC proposals to the Transvaal (no other such memoranda were found in the .
Transvaal archives relating to other parts of South Africa). The general
objectives of SANAC were described as indicating "the general conditions now
prevailing and to suggest a policy for South Africa as a whole to aim at in
view of Confederation" (52). Nevertheless, several of the report's recom-
mendations were immediately applicable to the Transvaal since it was "..desirable
to move steadily and quietly so as to avoid any unnecessary disturbance of the
native mind" (53). la particular, paragraphs 184-199 to regulate the purchase
of land by Africans and paragraphs 200-211 on the demarcation of Native Locations
so that there could be ensured "the early definition and delimitation of all
. lands dedicated and set apart with a view to finality in the provision of land
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nor the native population" (54). These objectives suggests that SANAC, in a short
term view, was part of the general policy of establishing an effective system of
native administration in the Transvaal, though clearly its recommendacions were
envisaged as being applicable to the rest of South Africa when it was united in
sone form of union.
In this respect, SANAC can be seen as the first step in a political response to
the economic and political challenge being made by non-whites in the Transvaal.
The most important of these was the economic challenge presented by the growth
of groups of peasant farners who showed an increasing response to the pull of the
market (55), and similar features can be observed in this growth of an African
peasantry to those in the Ciskei observed by Bundy, though no generalizations
should be drawn from this work (56). Certainly the level of the economic
response was dictated by the kind of social structures in which the peasantry
existed. It is possible, given differing social structures, to talk of
"different peasantries" (57) with the ultimate criterion being one of "having
certain rights in land and in the labour of family members on the land" (58),
although such rights also involve other rights and obligations, in a wider
economic system. A peasant system of agriculture, therefore, cannot be said
to be a distinct node of production like capitalism or feudalism but is dependent ,
r-v another mode, i.e. capitalism. This crucial point is important when the rise
\*J a peasantry is observed in South Africa for at no stage did the peasants
concerned have the sufficient economic or political power to enforce their
productive system onto the economy as a whole. In the Transvaal, for example,
it is only possible to observe certain features of a peasantry which suggest
more of a potential peasant class if the politico-economic preconditions for
ics survival had not been removed as early as they were.
When one analyses the nature of these "different peasantries" in the Transvaal,
however, two main groups emerge. On the one hand these was a small group or
independent African farmers who usually held title to land through missions and
had been able to *ain access to land both before ar.d after the Boar War. Most
of these farmers were concentrated around the Rustenburg area in the Western
Transvaal. On the other hand, there were those Africans who squatted on Crown
land or European farms or were still in locations. In varying degrees, their
social structures were less individualistic than the small "entrepreneurial"
class of independent farmers and vere typified by wider kinship structures with
political powar resting with headmen and chief (59). The latter group could be
said to show far less of a rational economic response to the pull of the market:,
jLough as the analysis will show, such features were not entirely absent in the
period after the Eoer War.
The first group of peasant farmers in the Western Transvaal, therefore, could be
said to be the most advanced and they indicated the potential for the peasantry
as a whole in the Transvaal. The Sub-Native Commissioner at Pilansberg, near
Linchve's Location, reported in 1910, for example:
I know of two natives who cultivate tobacco. One of them got 100,000
plants last year, and another native informed me that he had 30,000 (60),
while at Nylstroom, there was a report of farmers showing an awareness of the
potential for new crops:
...a good class of Hickory King maize is grown in the Southern Waterberg,
the seed being obtained from the settlers in that part. The Natives
were not slow to realize the heavier yield and better price realised
by this class of maize. Tne Natives in the Central and Southern Water-
berg find a ready sale for their produce at the various country stores (61).
African farmers in this part of the Transvaal, where there was a railway, did not
0>nLy depend on stores to buy their produce, for at Marico:
The Natives are improving their methods of farming and using better class
machinery, and manuring their lands. If the season is a good one, the
grain is exported to Johannesburg for which they use their oxen to trans-
port their produce to Zeerust Railway Station (62).
It should be emphasised that this market awareness was at this time selective and
other parts of the Transvaal remained backward. The Venda, for example, were
reported as "curiously superstitious about irrigation, and, in latter years, though
excellent facilities exist, they do not attempt to undertake new irrigation" (63).
In addition, the improvements that did take place often probably were due in no
small measure to the influence of missions; this is an area which needs further
research, using mission, records. But the Independent African churches were also
an influence too, especially when any of their members had been abroad and had
possibly come in contact with the ideas on industrial education of Booker T.
Washington. In their evidence to SANAC, for example, three members of the.
Ethiopian Church of Zion (formerly part of the African Methodist Episcopal Church)
states that they sought education for Africans so that:
...they would be allowed to buy farms outside for themselves, and to
^ create schools on then, whereon they could be taught industrial work (64).
The importance of this lies in the possibility that, given the economic possibilities,
the Independent Churches could establish a counter-ideology among non-whites during
this period after the Boer War. At SANAC, again, it was stated that the African
Methodist Episcopal Church, established in 1893, had by 1904 established 13 schools
with 4 to 5000 members and was applying for state aid (65).
The potential political challenge resulting can be perhaps most usefully seen from
the nature and spread of African farms over the Transvaal.
Table Two.
Division
Northern
Eastern
Central
jistern
Scrth Western
South Eastern
Farms owned by Africans
District No.
Zoutpansberg
Middelburg
Pretoria
Rustenburg
Waterburg
Wakkerstroom
in Transvaal,
, Farms
2
2
22
76
4
1
Source: Transvaal Native Affairs Department Annual
1903-4.
Area (acres)
5,000
7,136
111,979
387,730
23,580
10,720
Report, 1904.
The very nature of this kind of economic activity began, to run into opposition with
the prevailing ideology of white economic and political domination- In Pretoria,
for example, it was reported that:
...owing to the unscrupulous methods adopted by produce dealers of a
certain class, representations were made with the result that two
educated Native Constables were detailed for special duty on the
market to protect native interests (66).
This growing economic power was also almost certainly a fillip behind the
nascent political protest in.the Transvaal by Africans after the Boer War which
led to the eventual formation of the South African Native National Congress (.67).
One petition by the Native United Political Association of the Transvaal to the
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of England protested on "The prohibition of Natives from purchasing Landed
Property in the Transvaal Colony" in 1905 (68). The African fanner class clearly
were gaining the potential to organise politically and this nay well have been ;i
crucial factor governing the response from the white polity. The most important
point about this political opposition at this tine was its failure to perceive the
realities of the balance cf power in South Africa and the continuing belief, as
Walshe has shown (69), up to the end of the First World War that petitions and
delegations to Britain would alter the situation in South Africa. In addition, a
the very nature of the petition presupposes, there was a manifest belief in the
essential goodwill of white politicians in South Africa who, it was hoped, would
listen sympathetically to the Africans' case. Even Sol Plaatje, for example,
could not entertain the idea that Hertzog would let down the Africans. As he
wTote to W.P. Schreiner in 1910:
I was very much struck by the tactics of General Hertzog 20 years back
when he addressed a Dutch party at Fauresraith in favour of two Native
prisoners. I was but a youngster then but I .will never forget the
episode and I have carried with me a warm admiration for the general
all these years and I will be very much surprised if he also does
not see the justice of our modest request for immediate relief (70).
v
i
s some three years later were to prove him drastically wrong. As the analysis
ll seek to show in the next section, the white polity's response was to seek to
remove this potential economic base behind African political action with the result
that the African National Congress remained an essentially urban organisation led by
an African middle class elite.
In addition to the small independent class of African fanners, there was also a
growing economic response, albeit at a more simple level, by Africans in traditional
social structures. As their dispersal shows, this question was most relevant to
the Northern Transvaal.
Table Three.
Division
Northern
Eastern
Central
We3 tern
)jrth Western
South Eastern
District
Zoutpansberg
Middclberg
Pretoria
Rustenburg
Waterburg
Wakkerstroom
Government
No.
18
4
3
4
4
-
Locations
Area
519,731
23a,187
20,974
412,409
165,167
—
Undefined Locations
Crown Land s.
405,362
182,568
-
7,093
49,180
1,200
Source: Transvaal Native Affairs Department Annual Report, 1904.
Africans under conctiinal tenure were traditionally thought as backward and without
much internal capacity to modernize: the modernization ethic was believed to lie
in the wholly European-base culture of the white economy (71). But as events among
the Pedi of Chief Sekukuni after the Boer War showed, this view was not wholly true.
One of the grievances made plain to the Resident Concnissioner for the district under
Lagden was the role of trading stores in the area. In an interview with Ho°ge in
1902, it was explainedithat the South African Republic before the War had backed a
rival chief to Sekukuni, a man called Kolani, who was in turn backed by the owner of
a store on the location, a Mr. Hannan. During the war itself, with the relaxation
of Boer control, Sckukuni was able to seize power from Kolani and capture his arms
(supplied by the Boers through Hannan). It was then explained:
All Sekukuni1s enemies put their furniture in Hannan1s store for safety.
Hannan1s clerk took a rifle and joined Kolani. Sekukuni showed these
...11/...
-11-
th ings to his z-.en and told them to take only those things away
as ho did not wish to have Hannan's own goods whilst he was
away. There is only one white man who bought his store and
that is Mr. Law-rence who has never hated anyone. President
Kruger said that Hannan's and other stores only.changed hands
as the English won. Everyone paid Mr. Lawrence, even the
Boers. ...Mr. Lawrence is the only store keeper who has never
meddled in politics (72). . -
This evidence suggests an attitude that fully realised the political implications
of traders and shows the crucial influence stores had on the internal politics of
Sekukuniland. Even those African farmers under communal tenure were conversant
with the pull of the European market and sought to exercise some leverage on the
influence of traders. It was not incidental, therefore, that one of the grievances
expressed expressed by chiefs at SANAC was the inability of Africans to own trading
stores:
We are grieved that we see the Government allowing people to
trade on grounds that we have purchased, and yet we do not know
•N whom these people pay. The Government stops us from earning our
' livelihood with our own belongings (73).
This was clearly another factor in the economic and political challenge to European
hegeraony: as peasants, these Africans, in Monica Wilson's words were "radicals who
could and did adapt to a new world" (74) and were either going to win a growing
•place within the European economic system, with its concomitant political power,
or else be repelled by a response which, while utilizing the African labour supply
within the economic system, resisted the political implications of this. This
was the basis for the dialogue on the whole separatist issue that was to emerge
in the Transvaal in order to define the polity's response.
There were, however, certain parameters within which this response could be defined.
In a memorandum on squatting attached to the 1904 Report of the Department of Native
Affairs, Lagden publicly stated his views on the nature of squatting and his propo-
sals to deal with them. Regarding the question of locations, he ruled out the
the possibility of breaking them up and forcing the Africans to work in the European
economy: this was likely to "react in a way most detrimental to the interests of the
country"* as would any rigid enforcement or the 1895 Squatters Law (75). Instead,
Jhe. implication of the memo r and uia was that only selective enforcement of the Squatter^
Law should be pursued, especially where there was heavy squatting on low veld land
and where there were few European settlers, as in the Zoutpansberg and Waterberg,
while the firm basis for long-term policy would lie in the principles attached to
land settlement, upon which SANAC was to report. In this respect, then, a general
context for policy was defined which, while ruling out direct government compulsion,
nevertheless initiated a distinct ideological framework within which political
decisions could be made.
This framework was further defined by the state's clear opposition to forced labour
in order to reLieve the labour shortage in the European economy after the Boer War.
As Lagden wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs in 1906 befo-e leaving office;
...whilst we all wish Natives to go out and work and see no harm
in a little useful family pressure, the Government cannot lend it-
self to forced labour. The forcing must be the force of circum-
stances and not the force of • the law (7b) Emphasis added.
It was the circumstances, then, that were to be defined, in the best Nineteenth
Century liberal tradition that restricted the sphere of governmental activity.
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Tha acans, therefore, ware to be established from which the desirable ends, on
Adam Smith's analogy cf the "invisible hand",were expected to accrue. It was
not expected that the state, per se, would pursue these ends directly by itself,
though with the withdrawal of British imperial power this liberal definition oc
policy left itself open to being manipulated by state power which could impose
upon it a mobilising state ideology which, in its nature, resembled more that of
the Hegelian tradition in Central European political thought. For the meantime,
however, the means of policy were seen to crucially lie in sound principles of
land settlement. "It is neither useful nor reasonable" Lagden wrote in a
report of 1904, "to expect that the Natives should be endowed with land ir. such
quantity and on such terms as enable them to live at leisure11 (77), though he did
not at this stage propose a fully segregationist policy that actually restricted
the Africans' right to purchase land. It was only with SANAC in 1905 that this
becase officially recommended for the first time, thus initiating a segregationist
ideological response from within the white polity.
The post-war British colonial administration in the Transvaal can nevertheless
be said to have established certain essential preconditions for the establishment
of the ideology of segregation. On the finer points of policy they b-aulked,
preferring to leave them until after Responsible Government. In similarity of
Jsrceptions of politics and class interests, though, they were close to many
groupings within South Africa and, as Denoon has argued, in some respects the
Milner Administration, autonomous as it was, often identified and merged in with
the Progressives, who were in turn blamed for the disasters of Milner ism at the
1900 election (78). Sut the form and nature of segregation as such remained to
be developed after Responsible Government, when, in turn, the Transvaal was faced
with the question of articulating a distinct "native policy" in regard to the
coiaing Union in South Africa. In addition, any such segregationist ideology as
emerged would depend, for its point of reference, on the access to political
pover in South Africa and not on any imperial ties as such. This access to
political power was structured on both racial and class lines and, in the absence
of ar.y sizeable liberal external intervention from Britain, was able to reinforce
and not contradict, the material and political preconditions already laid down.
Upon this the ideological response of the white polity was established.
The response from within the white polity: 1907 to 1913:
With the establishment of Responsible Government in the Transvaal, a. whole debate
'Y&s initiated over "native policy" and the correct kind of "solution" to the
question of power for whites vis a vis non whites. Out of this debate there
emerged the ideology of segregation which, though tentatively introduced by ST.uts
in the 1911 Mines and Works Act, found concrete form in the agrarian sector with
the 1913 Land Act.
Perhaps because it was a debate with a polity already structured on racial lines,
the segregationist stance xv'hich emerged can be seen to depend upon the sane political
conditions as its counterpart in the American South at the time of the Jim.Crow lsws.
C. Vann Woodward has written on this period that:
The South1 s adoption of extreme racism was due not so much to a
conversion as it was to a relaxation of the opposition. All the
elements of fear, jealousy, proscription, hatred, and fanaticism
had long been present, as they are present in various degrees of
intensity in any society. what enabled them to rise to dominance
was not so much cleverness or ingenuity as it was a general
weakening and discrediting of the numerous forces that had hitherto
kept them in check....(79).
A similar process can be seen to occur in the Transvaal, strongly influenced in fact
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by the same segregationist ideas imported frotn the American South. The growing
strength of non-whites in agriculture in the Transvaal, as indeed in areas of
Natal and the Cape, polarised the question of power more sharply on racial lines.
1
 Within the white society as a whole, the either- or arguments of the "fusioaists"
versus the "segregationists"" became more intense and the latter were able to
exploit the factors Woodward mentions of fear, jealousu, hatred etc. to their
advantage. In addition, the withdrawal of British -imperial influence left the
liberals more isolated than hitherto and the liberal elements at work in England,
often stemming anyway from pro-Boer sympathisers (80), woke up too late to be
effective. In these circumstances, the protagonists of segregation met little
serious opposition and what debate there was took place in their own terras: i.e.
even the opponents o£ diehard segregation argued within at least a separatist
mould, to be repeated by liberal thinkers in South Africa right up to the
Second World War (81).
The segregationists were also able to pitch their arguments on a level of
political saliency that the liberals could not match. In a racially defined
political system as that of the Transvaal, no politician would venture to risk
his career on an issue of granting votes to non-whites, while all the political
•N parties in turn car.paigr.ed on platforms that restricted political rights to
' whites only. The restricted democratic systea of the Transvaal itself generated
a momentum towards greater racial exclusiveness and this was in turn to define
the nature of the debate. . •
It is possible, therefore, to see two component aspects to the ideological
response from the polity: 1) The general structure of the ideological debate
and 2) The Political application of the ideas that the debate generated. It
is proposed to analyse these in turn before seeing the culmination cf the
segregationist ideology in the 1913 Land Act.
1) The general structure of the ideological debate:
Interestingly enough, the debate on segregation mainly took place in the Transvaal
and the r.easou was not incidental. Many of the initial ideas started to be
discussed before Responsible Government and involved many members of the Milner
administration. Legassick, in fact, has pinpointed the basic origin of the
debate in the Fortnightly Club, a group mainly composed of the Kindergarten and
other members of the administration (some forty in number) who presented papers
) at fortnightly gatherings in 1906 (32).. The influence of this group was to be
seen on the Closer Union movement and one of the club's members, Richard Fee Cham,
was influential in establishing it (83).
However, with a perusal of the Pirn Papers, it is clear that the influences
Legassick mentions can be traced further back to before the report of SANAC.
One of the main influences on both Lagden and Lionel Curtis, who Legassick has
located as the central figure in the debate on segregation at the Fortnightly
Club, was Howard Pirn, who in turn was to become President of the Transvaal Native
• Affairs Society in 1908.
In 1903, Pirn wrote a paper for the Transvaal Philosophical Society on The Native
Question in South Africa which argued, in an undefined manner, the case for some
kind of racial separation. Using in particular the analysis of James Bryce on
the American South, Pirn argued that slavery had brought about the degradation of
the poor whites who were rendered economically superfluous. Once, however, the
slave was freed this question was alleviated so that in South Africa too:
i
. . . I think we may also conclude that if the Native in this
country work voluntariLy as free men in the open market, we
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need not fear the degradation of the white man (34).
On the other hand, it was most unlikely that the African would be admitted to a
position of any equality, despite the need for his labour. The question of any
solution lay in the labour question for which there was needed "a condition of
stable equilibrium, a condition economically sound, to maintain which all natural
laws will assist" (85). So far, Pim continued, only three solutions have been
offered on this: legal and moral pressure on the Africans, increased recruitment
and the use of imported Asiatic labour. Rejecting the first he said: it either
involved the use of direct pressure, which he rejected, or higher taxes which in
turn meant higher wages which the mining industry sought to resist. The second
solution only put off the evil day while, thirdly, the Asiatic labour question
meant the continued dependence on imported labour; Rejecting all these solutions,
Pim argued that the only way the question could ultimately be tackled was by
increasing the efficiency of the white economy and'reducing dependence on non-
white labour:
The only way in which Native wages can permanently be kept down to
a reasonable figure is by making the Native as far as possible
unnecessary to us. In some way or other we must learn to do
without hin unless and until he offers himself upon terms which
suit us. This should also be done as soon as possible, as every
day's delay means that a wage rise and we shall have to meet him
on a higher wage level (86).
This approach impressed Lagden who wrote to Pim in November of the same year asking
him to send a dozen copies or" the paper So that it could be distributed to every
member, of SANAC, vhich was shortly to meet at Glen Grey (87). Lagden was later
to hold that Glen Grey was largely a failure and an alternative strategy was
needed; though this may have been the product of the SA&VC hearings, it may well
also have beer, a result of reading Pirn's paper, which argued that the Act "..gives
everything for nothing. The grantees obtain their allotments without having
rendered service to the State: and the size of these allotments forbids them doing
more with them than raising sufficient produce to keep themselves and their families,
so that at no tine of their lives do they benefit the state, although they share its
most valuable asset" (83). In this respect, an alternative approach was needed
and Pim was able to develop his argument further some two years later.
In 1905, the British Association, a London body interested in the promotion of
science and education visited South Africa to hold a conference in Johannesburg in
August. It was divided into several sections and section "F" was concerned with
Economic Science. Larden was asked to give an address .but was unable to do so
since he was due to take his deferred leave in England. Lagden thus wrote to
Pim asking him to give a paper, an offer which Pim accepted. Pirn's paper was
called Some Aspects of the South African Native Problem and is the first traceabla
discussion of the question of segregation in South Africa, upon which Lionel Curtis1;.
paper on Segregation (89) was almost certainly drawn.
Pirn's argument was to stress the value of locations in the development of any native
policy in South Africa. There was both a general strategic aigument in their
helping to maintain the white population for:
One great safeguard the white populations surrounding these
reserves undoubtedly have ... is the native's intense love
for his own country;
but, in addition, there was a crucial economic argument in favour of the reserves.
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Though white agriculture, argued Pirn, had shown that it was able to successfully
compete with African agriculture and could probably supply the food needs of the
black population, chere was the value of the location as a supplier of labour
that overrode this loss of a potential market for white farmers:
The reserve is a sanatorium where they (the Africans) can recruit: .
if they are disabled they remain there. Their own tribal system .:
keeps them under discipline, and if they become criminals there
is not the slightest difficulty in bringing them to justice. All
this without expense to the white community...
As time goes on these location burdens will increase, and the
proportion of persons in the locations really able to work will
still further diminish... it is a fair assumption that at the
. outset one-fifth of the location population (I take it that the
location consists of families) is able to work. This means that
the wages paid by the employers will have to be sufficient to
support four other persons beside the workmen- Can it be
supposed that this will lead to a reduction in native wages. If
these persons live in a reserve, on the other hand, they will all
take part in growing their own food, and in no way depend upon the
white community (emphasis added).
These arguments from a professional man like Pirn received a wide hearing among
policy makers and "experts" on the native situation. What they crucially do is
to underline the economic motives for continuing with the present native policy
based on reserves and to transform then into suppliers of cheap labour at wage
rates below the subsistence of an ordinarily free market (90). In addition
they provided the basis for a policy that was soon to become known as "segregation"
and for an ideology of race separation:
...the differences between the native social system and our own
are so great that the two can never really form parts of one
social organism, any more than the races can amalgamate.
Such an ideology, however, needed to be more historically orientated than a mere
repetition of the traditional pattern of race relations in South Africa. An
ideology, in fact, orders traditional concepts and symbols and provides an overall
framework, or, as Clifford Geertz has suggested, a "cultural system" (91), which in
turn defines consciousness. In order to do this, however, an ideology has to first
establish itself within the prevailing culture and it has to accordingly direct
perceptions into certain channels. It has, in other words, to provide a "social
construction of reality" (92) that envisages a future social condition: this is
why, therefore, "segregation", with its vision of a distinct future pattern of race
relations, is qualitatively different to traditional concepts of racial separatism
that essentially drift along on an ad hoc basis with only a vague sense of a future
model of racial patterning. It was this historicist element in segregation that
was to emerge as the discussion on native policy developed in the Transvaal.
Pirn, for example, presented another r»aner at the Fortnightly Club called
The Question of Race on November 15t'i 1906. Here he argued the case for a
distinct native policy which "should if possible be drawn together by the thread
of some definite view as to the probable future". Here, three distinct alternative-
were offered: firstly, there was fusion of the races, which Pirn considered
"unthinkable as long as we retain our self respect", secondly, "their inter-
mingling throughout the country as distinct races, indivisible elements in our
social organism", which again Pirn rejected on the grounds of the natural
differences of the races:
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. ..at quite an e^rly stage In Che intercourse between these
peoples and the white race, the centrifugal forces overcome
the centripetal, the two races each tend to segregate, and
each commences to build up for itself its own public opinion,
social standards, and peculiar interests;
but the argument for the third alternative of segregation went on to suggest a
case for territorial division based on land ownership:
To root the native firaly in the land gives the country as a
whole the best security it can obtain for a stable and quiet
future. He will be content there as he can be nowhere else,
and he will have something to lose if he should misbehave
himself. Cattle he values, and land he will be gin to value
as his ownership becomes limited and circumscribed.
The argument was based upon a rather idyllic concept of traditional African society,
on which at that time no really substantial fieldwork had been made (the first was
to be Junod's Life of a South African Tribe) and much of the thinking on African
social structures was based on the static and unhistorical interpretations of Dudley
Kidd's The Essential Kaffir published at the beginning of the century and followed
Kaffir Socialism in 1908.
The effect of Pirn's paper on that of Lionel Curtis at the Fortnightly Club is
clear. Called The Place of Subject Peoples in the Empire, Curtis advanced
similar arguments in a more rigorous and ideological node. The first objective,
he stated, was "towards encouraging a proper state of mind on the part of the
European population in South Africa".(Emphasis added) Looking at the question
from an imperial angle, Curtis argued that the main question was to formulate a
solution such that South Africa should not always be in a state where it was
taught "to think of falling back on British troops for the suppression of native
disorder even as a last resort" and the solution to this lay on lines suggested
by Pirn. Curtis's view, however, was intensely ideological:
Great problems like these cannot be solved in a day but given one
authority in South Africa with a strong hand guided for generations
by a clear purpose there is nothing to prevent the gradual segre-
gations of the natives in the great locations already set apart (93)
(emphasis added).
-/statement like this rings with an air of familiarity for most South African today
and shows clearly the strong ideological content implicit in the concept of segrega
tion. The importance of the statement lies in its undoubted influence on those
involved in the Closer Union movement. This question has been substantially
ignored by Leonard Thompson when he discusses what he calls "the impulse towards *
union" (94). It seems clear that from the very beginning these segregationist
arguments were implicit in the movement towards closer union. In the Fortnightly
Club membership, for example, was W. Wybergh who was to become editor of The State
which was founded in 1908 as the organ of the Closer Union Movement. On the
committee of this journal was Howard Pirn, Richard Feetham (author on the paper at
the Fortnightly Club on federation in South Africa), Philip Kerr anf F. Burger,
Secretary of Het Volk while Patrick Duncan was chairman. In its second number
in February 1909, The State argued that "the policy of segregation deserves more
careful study" (957^ By this time, Howard Pirn was President of the Transvaal
Niiciva Affairs Society, founded in 1908 to promote "...the study and discussion
of the South African native question, with a view to enunciating and advocating
s liberal, consistent and practical Native policy throughout South Africa" (96)
The influence of this Society almost certainly made Pirn break with the more extreme
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segregationist thought that was beginning to prevail in South Africa and to take
a position that, though still separatist, sought to establish the principle that:
we are trustees for and not owners of the power we possess over
our fellow men, whether we have obtained it by inheritance or
even by our own individual efforts. The principle once accepted
we are bour.d to see that all those we rule, including the native
races of this country, are placed in a position to obtain for
themselves the opportunities that will give scope to any capacity
they may have for self development (97).
This view was to contrast quite markedly with the segregationist ides of Wybergh,
editor of The State and also a member of the Native Affairs Society, and Fred Bell
who captured control of the Society in 1910 and was the dominating influence until
the Society's demise in 1911 (the last meeting was in 1912). Wybergh, for example,
drove The State by 1910 to the position that:
If South Africa is to remain a white man's country it is essential
that the whole of the soil now available for white men should be
^ occupied and worked by a strenuous race of white farmers, as the
) • struggle of the future will be an economic battle between whites
and blacks (98) (Emphasis added).
This was in a favourable review of a paper by Bell "A Suggested Solution to the
South African Race Problem" which was read at a joint meeting of the Native Affairs
Society and the Union Club in October 1909. Bell's paper popularised the issues
for a wider audience and was able to make an appeal on a vehemently racist set of
arguments.. Arguing the case for segregation on the two premises that "the native
is a lowe race and as such should be aided and guided by the white race" and that
"each race should be encouraged to develop separately along its own natural line",
Bell was able to appeal directly to prejudice and fear:
It has been said that three courses only are before us -
extermination, assimilation, or segregation. I make bold to
say that if segregation, or separation, be not adopted, ex-
termination will come about through assimilation, but it will
be the white race which will be absorbed! (99)
) By the time, then, that Pirn nade his final address to the Native Affairs Society
in 1910 pleading for the use of scientific analysis and the further gathering of
data on "the native question" (100), the momentum of the argument had shifted to
a considerably more ideological position. The activities of the Native Affairs
Society were suspended under Bell's presidency because of the 1910 election and
the ostensibly non-political role the Society saw icself as having precluded
direct political discussion. However, the political implications were fairly
clear in that two of its members, Cresswell and Wybergh, joined the Labour Party
which was to fight the election on the most overtly segregationist platform (101).
.There is evidence, and-in his papers there is the suggestion that he sought to
revive the White League, a body which had been active over the Chinese labour issue
and had sent a deputation to Lord Milner (102). In a leaflet printed by the same
printers and carrying the same statements as one produced by the White League,
there was the warning:
Vote Nationalist at this Crisis, whatever your party, unless
you want the Nigger vote...
Beware! Giving one vote in the Union Parliament for Dr. Jameson's
desire, and you have the Nigger vote all over South Africa (103).
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The impact of this kind of propaganda needs further research, but it does suggest
trends away from the general view expressed by Thompson that the non-whita factor
was not an important issue in the 1910 election: the fact that the Labour Party
won four seats on the Reef on an ostensibly segregationist policy and that
electoral pacts were made with Het Volk in several other seats suggests that the
non-white issue had sone saliency despite the prevalence of the cleavages over
Hertzogism. At the very least, the 1910 election was the opportunity for the
whole segregation debate to permeate through into the political system with
important repercussions, as the next section of this paper seeks to show.
-2. The political application of the segregation debate: 1910 to 1913:
With the general ppularisation of the ideas "on segregation discussed in the
earlier part of the first decade of the century, the essential nature of the
ideological debate in the Transvaal on "the native question" could be said to
have been formed by 1910. With the exception of Patrick Duncan1s Suggestions
for a Native Policy, which essentially continued the liberal separatist strand
represented by Pin after 1908, there were no major new contributions until after
the First World War when non-whites like Jabavu were also to participate (104).
However, at the same time, the ideas the debate generated can be seen to play
an increasingly important role in the political response by the white policy.
Compared to the 1907 election, for example, the Het Volk ideology of "conciliation"
could be seen to have failed: the gained only 55% of the Transvaal seats compared
to their previous win of 63%, while Hertzog wiped the board in the Orange Free
State, winning 16 seats to 1 won by the Unionists. Clearly national and "racial"
questions (defined in Boer-British terms) were the most salient issues and, if the
testimony of Van den Heever is to be accepted, the dominant motives of Hertzog
were national ones, formed in fact in his student days (105). On the other hand,
Hertzo»Ts nationalist ambitions depended upon his gaining support in the Transvaal
and hence destroying tha "conciliation" policy of 3otha and Smuts. The latter,
however, were committed to this whole issue to a profound extent by 1910 (106)
while the whole philosophical approach of Smuts, the guiding mind of Ket Volk,
was substantially different, in its British empiricist mould, to that of Kertzog.
These different approaches were in turn to lead, after the split in 1913 and the
formation of the Nationalist Party, to what Stadler has called respectively the
conciliationist strategy of the S.A.P. and the nobilisationist strategy of the
\ Nationalists (107). But in the initial period after 1910, there is the clear
implication in some of Hertzog's correspondence that he was looking for an issue
that would help to mobilise Afrikaner supporters on more than a mere anti-
conciliationist and anti "foreign fortune seekers" platform.
This issue could be seen in segregation and in an interesting exchange of letters
with Fred Bell in 19.11 to 1912, Hertzog can be seen to realise its inherent
political value. As he wrote to Bell on 25th September 1911:
I cannot help thanking you for the valuable hints you have
given me on this modus operandi. I fully agree with you .-
I am glad to have from you what you consider points that
may give rise to opposition (108),
while regarding Bell's ideas on the subject of segregation, he later wrote:
I think you should not publish your statement before something
definite is going to be done by the party - at any rate first
see whether the party is going to tackle the question (109).
Instead, therefore, of suggesting segregation as a matter of party policy, Hertzog
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preferred to wait and see whether Burton, as the Minister of Native Affairs, was
going to produce segregationist legislation. The whole question, however,
depended upon timing and with the National Congress of the SAP due to be held at
Bloerafontein in November 1911, Hertzog prepared to wait- As he wrote to Bell on
the 19th October:
I feel very hopeful of our ideas ultimately prevailing.
In the meanwhile we must be very careful not to precipitate
matters in too great a hurry. You know I do not by that
mean that we should pursue a dilatory course, but sowing ,
must necessarily precede reaping (110) (Emphasis added).
The result of the Bloemfontein Congress was not a positive statement on Native
Policy and Botha instead concentrated upon his favourite theme of encouraging
white iimigratio^ and land settlement (111). In addition, Burton's Squatters
Bill introduced early in 1912 sought only to regulate squatting and did not seek
to restrict the right of Africans to purchase land. The Bill was dropped
anyway in the 1912 session, possibly because, as Plaatje maintains, Burton
conceded to the case of a deputation sent to. him in Cape Town of the recently
formed South African Native National Congress (112), but also because Botha was
A afraid of incurring the hostility of the British Government: after a speech
by Selbourne in the House.of Lords attacking the Bill as introducing forced
labour, Botha sent a telegram to Burton on the same day drawing his attention
to it (113), clearly evidencing his concern. The overall result, therefore,
was that by May when Hertzog became Minister of Native Affairs in addition to
that of Justice, the Government had failed to evolve a coherent Native Policy
and this gave Hertzog his opportunity.
Hertzog came to Native Affairs with few original ideas or experience, but was
nevertheless determined to turn it into some sort of political advantage. As
he wrote to Bell on the 16th August 1912:
I am very much impressed by the vastness and importance of the
subject, but no less confident of a favourable solution of its
most salient problems;
and at the saae tine showed that he "was very pleased to see Maurice Evans's
suggestion as to a solution"' (114). Maurice Evans in his book Black, and
•v White in South East Africa published in 1910 argued three main principles of
* policy, based upon separatism though, not overly, segregation. These
principles were that 1) The White Man must govern; 2) that the Parliament
elected by white men "must realize that while it is their duty to decide upon
the lines of policy to be adopted, they must develop a large measure of power
to those specifically qualified, and must refrain from undue interference"
and 3) that "the main lines of policy must be separation as far as possible" (115)
Ideas such as these, together with Bell's influence, were crucial to the thinking
of Hertzog while he was at the Native Affairs Department. Bell, for example,
continued to correspond with Hertzog until November 1912, one month before the
• De Wildt speech when-Hertzog was expelled from the Botha cabinet. He was
especially influenced by Bell's hostility to the mildly separatist proposals
of Duncan's pamphlet Suggestions for a Native Policy, published in 1912, which
did not suggest any simple solution in the form of legislation, which was what
Bell' argued, "but in a slow and painful revision of our attitudes to the native"
(116). Hertzog's approach lay in some form of legislation, however, and he wrote
to Bell on 12th November 1912:
I am getting ahead quite nicely, and hope in another month's
time to have the whole matter far enough advanced for discus-
sion with ray colleagues (117),
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which suggests that a document was prepared while Hertzog was at the Native
Affairs Department proposing segregationist legislation and that this in turn,
as Tatz has argued, was crucial in the preparation of the Bill in 1913 introduced
by Sauer restricting the Africans1 rights to buy land (118). The political
advantages of this for Hertzog were manifest: segregationist legislation were an
attack on the Cape liberal tradition, instead of a political compromise between
the Cape liberals like Burton and Sauer and the moderates in the Transvaal.
Burton, for example, had written to Rissik at the time of the preparation of his
Bill to regulate squatting that he did not consider it substantially different
from the latter's Occupation of Lands Bill of 1908 which did not seek to restrict
the Africans1 right to buy land, and was criticised for its failure to do so (119).
With his expulsion from the cabinet, however, having evidently chosen the right
psychological mcraer.t with the De Wildt speech to attack the conciliation policy,
Hertzog was in a good position to exploit the weak policies of the Botha government
and this was possibly a reason why Botha selected the Cape liberal Sauer to
succeed Hertzog while still basing his policy on the latter's principles: "whig
men but tory measures", which was the essence of conciliationism. Though a Bill
was not immediately drawn up, it was clear that as soon as any demand came for it
>from among the government's ranks, then they would have to make the essential
"concessions to preserve party unity. It is clear, too, froa the Native Affairs
Archive that no ready made proposals were at hand when General Lenimer asked the
Minister of Native Affairs on February 18th 1913 what the portion of fanr.s was in
the Transvaal that were registered in the names of Africans during the previous
three years and what was their extent and the amount paid for them. The immediate
reply of the Minister was based on the fact that the Transvaal alone kept accurate
records ol such transactions, as a letter to the Minister from the Department of
Lands implies (120). The matter, therefore, was not already "cut and dried'1
as Plaatje argued (121) and matters only developed under the threat of political
pressure. On the 2Sth February 1913, an Orange Free State member moved that tha
government introduce a squatters bill and this was further amended by a Transvaal
member "to take effective measures to restrict the purchase and lease of land by
Natives" (122). The momentum of segregationist demands had actively reached into
the ranks of the government's own supporters and it was then, and indeed on the
same day, the 28th February, that a memorandum was drawn up by the Native Affairs
Department suggesting a Natives Land Bill (123).
The Bill, however, failed to fulfill Hertzog's intentions of applying segregation
Jto the whole of South Africa. The Cape was excluded, much to Hertzog's regrets
(124), while Botha too, though accepting the general principles of the Bill, argued
that the Bill did not contribute a solution to "this Native question" because "the
time was not ripe for it by a long way" (125). This point was possibly made with
one eye on the British government, in the hope that it would not create any
opposition from his friends in the Liberal Government there, especially Sir William
Harcourt. In addition, Botha stressed that the Bill meant separation and not
segregation (126) and this, too, was probably intended to keep the support of the
Cape liberal wing inside the government. In a general political sense, though,
the Bill was a triumph for Hertzog for it led to a general expulsion of Africans
from farms in the Orange Free State: a process which was well documented by R.W.
Msimang and Sol Plaatje (127), though the impact of the Bill in the Transvaal
n^eds further research. The strength of the Orange Free State support was evidence.
by the virtual collapse of the SAP machine there when" Hertzog left the party in
1914 to found the Nationalist Party (128). In addition, Hertzog probably felt
that he could make gradual inroads into the SAP support in the Transvaal, a view
that was summed up by Tielman Roos at the time of Hertzog's split in 1913:
Our reports from the Transvaal are very favourable; the country
is warmer, and if we strike quickly you should win it for your
principles (129).
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This optimism was Co pay off in the long run. When Hertzog left the SAP in November
1913, only eight Orange Free State M??s went with hie, and the first . Kacionalisc
Congress in July 1914 was based on the Free State only (130). It was the outbreak
of War and the rebellion which "were instrumental in giving the Hertzogite movement
a national following" (131).and, as Trapido has suggested, the rebellion may well
have had economic causes, based on poor.white farmers who failed Co benefit frora
Botha's land settlexont policy (132). As an example of rather "primitive rebels",
they certainly evidence some kind of rural discontent. On these grievances,
Hertzogism, as a combination of nationalism arid segregationism, was able to
mobilise rural and urbanising Afrikaners into a populist movement that becama a
serious force by the 1915 election (133). Segregation finally entered into the
thinking of the white polity.
Conclusion: the implications for South African politics:
The previous analysis has attempted to show that^there are clear links in South
African politics between Afrikaner nationalism as a mobilising political strategy
and segregation. This is not to suggest that segregation was purely a product of
Afrikaner thought and was not favoured by English speakers: as the analysis of the
segregation debate in Che Transvaal shows, the ideas were substantially discussed
"A by English-speakers. On the other hand, the actual political application of
segregation depended upon a context which was defined by the "racial" cleavages
between Hertzogism and the conciliation policy of Botha and Smuts. This dependence
thus appears to validate Garsonfs assertion that:
There have always been two strands in South African politics,
one of white-white questions and the other of black-white
questions, and they have always been closely interwoven (134).
But, in addition, these "questions" need to be seen in a dynamic and cumulative
manner. The rise of Hertzogism and Afrikaner nationalism implied a process of
cumulative verzuilinq (135) of the Afrikaner population; in turn, the attainment
of power of the [lertzcg government, in coalition with the segregationist Labour
Party led by Cresvell, in 1924 represented a further extension of the ideas of
segregation from the agrarian sector to the industrial, aided by the Report of
the Stallard Commission on Local Government, which recommended urban segregation
(136) and the precedent of the Nativer (Urban Areas) Act of 1923.
-, The rise of segregation in the post Boer War period and the development of a
) segregationist ideology iu the Transvaal in the period after Responsible Government
can, therefore, be seen as starting a long-term process. It has already been
argued that the ideology of segregation was an intrinsic part of a political respond*
by the white polity in the Transvaal to the challenges from non-whites in Che
agrarian sector (a challenge that, with growing industrialization after the First
World War was to be increasingly seen in the industrial sector). This long-term
process, in addition can also be seen as a counter revolution by agrarian and
industrial interests within the white polity. "Our present situation" wrote
Professor MacMillan in 1919 "has many points in consnon with those of England in
"the Eighteenth Century industrial revolution, when similar competition, with the
practice of enclosures, drove the rural population into the towns to become the
raw material of the labour which went to the building up of the great English
industries" (137). He failed to specify the exact political mechanics of this
and here there are very real differences to the English experience. Instead of
a long and protracted struggle between Industrial and urban interests, which
pervaded English politics effectively until the end of the Nineteenth Century (138),
there can be seen to occur an alliance between them in South Africa that has all
the mechanics of a different path towards modernization: what Barrington Moore,
in fact, has called a "revolution from above" (139). The former path on the
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liberal denocratic pattern in England ensured, to a large extent, some kind of
reliance upon, market mechanisms to ensure an adequate labour supply, the latter
modal of "revolution from above", on the other hand, relies essentially upon
political mechanisms:
The distinction I am trying to suggest is one between the use
of political mechanisms (using the terra broadly ...) on the one
hand and reliance on the labour market, on the other hand,; to
ensure an adequate labour force for working the soil and the
creation of an agricultural surplus for consumption by other
classes. Those at the bottom suffer severely in both cases (140).
The path .of .Sau£h Africa, therefore, can be said to be characterised by a labour
repressive economy which extracts a portion of surplus over and above that secured
by a free market mechanism, using that term in its most classicla sense. This
labour repression, in turn, helps to explain historically such a notion as a "white
labour aristocracy" which exists in. turn from a surplus extracted from the non-
white urban and rural proletariat (141). The approach of this paper has been
to point out the initial preconditions for this counter-revolution in the agrarian
sector in the Transvaal in the first part of the century and to stress how,
ultimately, they depended upon alignments within the white political system. A
purely mechanistic analysis tracing all developments back to the economic base,
as in the work of tfolpe (142), is not sufficient. In the final analysis, the
whole trend in development depended on a political alliance between agrarian and
industrial interests, and on this the final word must go to Botha speaking in the
debate in 1908 on Rissik's^Occupation of Lands Bill:
We have two great industries; the one is the mining industry,
the other agriculture and cattle farming. These two go hand
in hand (143).
Paul Rich
University of the Witwatersrand, February 1975.
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